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Bwndy v. Jackson: Eliminating the Need to Prove
Tangible Economic Job Loss In Sexual
Harassment Claims Brought Under Title VII
In the case of Bundy v. Jackson, the federal appellate court eliminated
the need to prove tangible job loss in claims under Title VII relating to sex-
ual harassment. The holding in Bundy thus promotes the viability of sex-
ual harassment claims under Title VII and deters employers from
engaging in subtle sexual harassment as "part of the job." The decision
provides a model for the nation to follow in the pursuit of the worthy goal
of eliminating sexual harassment in the workplace.
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) makes it un-
lawful for employers to base employment decisions involving hir-
ing, termination, and promotion on the sex of the employee.1 To
find a violation of Title VII, the discrimination suffered by the em-
ployee must be sufficiently related to the "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment."2
In Bundy v. Jackson,3 a claim of sexual harassment 4 was
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1978), which reads as follows:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
viduals race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;...
(emphasis added).
2. Id.
3. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Prior to appeal, the plaintiff's claim of sexual
harassment was found to be unwarranted by the lower court. That court found
that the sexual advances encountered by Ms. Bundy were "standard operating
procedure, a fact of life, a normal condition of employment in the office." Bundy v.
Jackson, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 828, 831 (1979), rev'd and remanded, 641
F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
4. Sexual harassment has been given the following definition:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII. Un-
welcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or re-
jection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employ-
ment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's work per-
formance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.
brought under the sexual discrimination protection afforded by
Title VII. The court, however, encountered a major obstacle: past
cases pertaining to the "terms and conditions" requirement were
far from uniform. One line of cases found that no "term or condi-
tion" of employment was affected without proof that the em-
ployee sustained a tangible economic job loss. The Bundy court
rejected that viewpoint and held that a victim of sexual harass-
ment need not prove tangible job loss in order to recover. The
problem recognized by the court has been aptly stated:
The vast majority of women in blue-collar and clerical jobs (many of
whom are supporting families) cannot risk losing a job in retaliation for a
complaint. Nor can they afford the time required to look for another job.
Legal remedies often are available only after a woman has been fired or
quits and few can afford the time or money required to seek redress. 5
Acknowledging the demeaning and abusive nature of sexual
harassment, the Bundy court determined that sexual harassment
alone, without a showing of tangible job loss, was enough to prove
that the discrimination suffered related to a "term or condition" of
employment. 6 The Bundy judgment is one that this author be-
lieves should be imitated in all American jurisdictions.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Cases involving the issue of when discrimination violates a
"term or condition" of employment within the meaning of Title
V117 have been neither consistent nor reconcilable. Some courts
E.E.O.C. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(1980). Consequently, when a person receives sexual advances through verbal or
physical conduct (a request for sexual relations or a suggestive gesture) that is
not welcomed, that conduct is considered sexual harassment.
5. Polansky, Sexual Harassment at the Workplace, 8 Hum. RTs. 14, 17 (1980)
This article deals with the many problems of sexual harassment and the difficul-
ties in seeking redress.
6. The court asked "whether the sexual harassment of the sort Bundy suf-
fered amounted by itself to sex discrimination with respect to the 'terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment.'" That question was answered by stating "we
believe that an affirmative answer follows .... " 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(emphasis omitted).
7. Because sexual harassment is not specifically referred to in Title VII, sex-
ual harassment had to be defined as a form of sex discrimination. See, e.g., Barnes
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Barnes court rested its decision on
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), a per curiam decision in
which Justice Marshall stated in his concurring opinion that a policy of hiring
males with pre-school aged children, but not females in the same position, estab-
lished a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Other cases have similarly held,
consistent with Barnes, that sexual harassment is sex discrimination. See, e.g.,
Garber v. Saxon Business Products, Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (when em-
ployer engages in practice where female employees are compelled to submit to
sexual advances, that practice is violation of Title VII); Tomkins v. Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (court emphasized that any sexual ad-
vances must result in direct employment consequences).
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have liberally interpreted the phrase, while others have adopted a
stricter approach.
Those cases advancing the strict viewpoint have required that
sexual advances must result in direct employment conse-
quences.8 Thus, the employee must suffer an economic loss. One
such court refused a harassment claim fearing that to do other-
wise would open the floodgates to discrimination litigation. 9
These courts have feared that there "would be a potential federal
lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually ori-
ented advances toward another,"lO and have believed that the
only sure way to prevent such sexual dilemmas in the workplace
would be to hire asexual employees."
It is clear that not all cases propounding the strict definition of
"terms or conditions" deal with sexual discrimination. Most of
these cases pertain to employment discrimination in general. Ra-
cial slurs and derogatory comments have been found insufficient,
in and of themselves, to constitute a violation of a "term or condi-
tion" of employment.12 Likewise, differing treatment of male and
female physical education teachers was insufficient to give rise to
a Title VII violation.' 3 These two examples demonstrate that it is
8. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977). The court found that Title VII would be violated only if sexual advances
were conditioned on an employee's "job-status evaluation, continued employment,
promotion or other aspects of career development.. . ." Id. at 1049.
9. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975) (sexual har-
assment claim was denied because a supervisor's alleged conduct had no relation-
ship to nature of employment).
10. Id. at 163.
11. Id. at 163-64.
12. Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir.
1977). Supervisors of Cariddi, who was a ticket taker at Chief's football games, re-
ferred to him as a "dago" and to other Italian Americans as "Mafia." Id. at 87.
When Cariddi brought an action based on national origin discrimination, it was de-
nied by the lower court and affirmed on appeal. The court recognized that this
type of abuse could rise to the level necessary to constitute a violation of Title VII,
but did not so arise under the facts of the case. Id. at 88.
13. Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979). In this case, a female physical education teacher
alleged discrimination in the form of unequal treatment in regard to facilities
available to her as opposed to those available to her male counterparts. Mrs. Har-
rington had a small, unsecure office, no private locker, and no toilet or shower fa-
cilities, all of which males in similar positions had. Id. at 193-94. The
discrimination was established, but relief was unavailable because "Mrs. Harting-
ton failed to establish her claim that she was constructively discharged or that she
was discriminated against in the salary she received." Id. at 197. Here, the court
placed emphasis on an economic condition, which is a very narrow requirement.
difficult to prove that such treatment violates a "term or condi-
tion" of employment even though an employee is subjected to dif-
ferential treatment because of race or sex. The strict view, then,
requires that the discrimination result in tangible job loss for the
victim.
On the other side, some courts have struggled to bring certain
forms of discrimination within the realm of the "terms and condi-
tions" requirement. Under the liberal viewpoint, this requirement
has been defined as an "expansive concept."'14 This line of cases
gives recognition to the fact that the "environment" to which an
employee is subjected is enough to constitute a "term or condi-
tion" of employment. 5 Demeaning an employee before his peers
through the derogation of religious beliefs 16 or racial overtones
present in the workplace17 has been found to constitute a viola-
tion of the "terms or conditions" of employment. Although em-
ployees who can prove no economic or tangible job loss are left
without a remedy under the strict view, their claims are still via-
ble under the more expansive view. While the view requiring no
economic, tangible job loss has been adhered to in other discrimi-
14. Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972) (racial discrimination).
15. Id. at 238. The Rogers court recognized that a discriminatory atmosphere
or environment could be sufficient "to destroy completely the emotional and psy-
chological stability of minority group workers." Id.
16. Compston v. Borden, 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976). The plaintiff al-
leged that he was discharged as a result of his religious faith and ancestry. The
court recognized the employee's right to be free from harassment, but awarded
only nominal damages because the court found that the discharge did not result.
from religious considerations. Id. at 162.
17. Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Black bus
drivers brought suit alleging discrimination in hiring practices by their employer.
The court found that "[i]nsofar as plaintiff's complain that Greyhound's hiring
practices have resulted in their own subjection to discriminatory treatment in the.
workplace, they are asserting interests clearly within the scope of Title VI's pro-
tection against discrimination in the 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment."' Id. at 176. See also, United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612
(W.D.N.Y. 1978), af'd and modified on other grounds, 633 F.2d 643 (1980). In this
case, the hiring practices of the city's police and fire departments were challenged,
by the United States Attorney General. The court determined that economic bene-
fits are no longer the only benefits that have to be abridged in order to violate Title
VII. The court remarked that "intangibles, such as psychological impact upon mi-
nority employees from a work environment heavily charged with discrimination,
fall within the protection of the expansive statutory language." Id. at 631. See also
Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977). St. Louis firehouses had established "sup-
per clubs" which, in effect, promoted the exclusion of blacks in kitchen activities.
Again, the court recognized that the city had a duty to provide a "nondiscrimina-
tory work environment," that the "supper clubs" were "highly offensive" and
therefore unacceptable conditions of employment (violating Title VII). Id. at 514-
15.
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nation contexts, it should be noted that this expansive view had
not been followed in a sexual harassment case prior to Bundy.
Therefore, two lines of authority exist. One requires a definite
showing of a tangible, economic job loss, and the other allows a
discriminator'y work environment to suffice for a Title VII viola-
tion. Regardless of which view is followed, questions arise. Will
there be a lawsuit every time one employee receives differing
treatment? Do some decisions promote subtle discrimination
short of becoming a violation of employment conditions? The
Bundy court was thus faced with these two opposing views.
HI. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Sandra G. Bundy was employed by'the District of Columbia De-
partment of Corrections in April of 1970, and thereafter received
several promotions.1 8 However, as time wore on, Ms. Bundy's
promotions became less frequent. Claims of inadequate work
performance were used to justify delays in her promotion.19
Ms. Bundy's initial encounters with sexual harassment oc-
curred in May of 1972. Ms. Bundy was subjected to sexual harass-
ment from her first line supervisor all the way up to her ultimate
ranking supervisor.2 0 These harassing activities continued, and
Sandra Bundy consequently filed a series of complaints, the first
18. For an excellent factual chronology, see Bundy v. Jackson, 19 Fair Empl.
Prac. (BNA) 828 (1979). In summary, Ms. Bundy received promotions in Decem-
ber of 1970 (eight months after being hired as Personnel Clerk), September of
1973, January of 1974, and July of 1976. Id. at 829-30.
19. Id. These claims of nonperformance stem from several instances described
as follows: Bundy took sick leave in 1973 and 1974 because of major surgery; she
took sick leave at various times between 1974 and 1976; she did not correctly com-
pile statistics, fie required reports, or make adequate field contacts, according to
supervisors.
20. The chronology of sexual advances made toward Sandra Bundy is as fol-
lows: In May of 1972, Ms. Bundy.began receiving phone calls at her home inviting
her out for drinks from one of her fellow employees (who would later become her
supervisor, and the defendant in this suit). Ms. Bundy informed the caller that
she was not interested. Late in 1972, Ms. Bundy's highest ranking supervisor took
her out for drinks but at that time made no improper sexual advances. In June of
1974, Ms. Bundy's second line supervisor, who made all recommendations in re-
gard to hiring and firing, began making sexual advances toward her, by inviting
her to view sexual literature with him at various places. Subsequently, Ms.
Bundy's first line supervisor began harassing her through many methods (includ-
ing an invitation to "lay up in a motel" as well as an offer of a trip to the Baha-
mas). Finally, in early 1975, when Ms. Bundy complained to a supervisor, she
received a response in the form of an invitation to go to bed. All of these advances
were promptly rejected. Id. at 830-31.
of which was initiated in April of 1975.21 When the results of
these administrative complaints met with obvious dissatisfaction,
Ms. Bundy filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia alleging discrimination on the basis of sex.
The initial decision in the district court resulted in the following
findings: the plaintiff had proved the existence of improper sex-
ual advances; 22 plaintiff's promotional delays were due to inade-
quate work performance;23 and defendant did not discriminate
against plaintiff on the basis of sex in any "term or condition" of
employment.24 The court, therefore, awarded judgment for the
defendant.25
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Terms, Conditions, and Privileges of Employment
Requirement of Title VII
After concluding that sexual harassment is a form of sexual dis-
crimination maintainable under Title VII,26 the Bundy court
reached one other preliminary matter before addressing the criti-
cal issue of the case. It was determined that the discrimination
suffered by Ms. Bundy was accomplished with the full knowledge
of supervisory personnel. 27 This factor is important in establish-
ing that discrimination flowed from those who had control over
employment decisions; therefore, such discrimination could be
viewed as a policy of the employer and not just an isolated
incident.
The novel and critical question raised in Bundy was "whether
the sexual harassment of the sort Bundy suffered amounted by it-
self to sex discrimination with respect to the 'terms, conditions, or
21. Ms. Bundy made an informal complaint to an Equal Employment Opportu-
nity (EEO) officer on or about April 14, 1975. On June 18, 1975, a formal complaint
was filed with the Department of Corrections. Further, a formal complaint was
filed with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights in August of 1975. All
claims alleged discrimination in employment based on sex. Id. at 832.
22. Id.
23. Id. (Conclusion of Law 3 found that promotion delays were not due to re-
jection of sexual advances).
24. Id. (Conclusion of Law 5 held that Ms. Bundy was promoted as quickly or
even more quickly than males similarly situated).
25. Id.
26. 641 F.2d at 943. "We thus readily conclude that Bundy's employer discrimi-
nated against her on the basis of sex." See also note 7 supra, for other cases deal-
ing with the definition of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination
actionable under Title VII; Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979)
(summary judgment for defendant reversed where black woman fired because she
refused supervisor's demand for sexual favors from a "black chick").
27. "[O]fficials in the agency who had some control over employment and pro-
motion decisions had full notice of harassment committed by agency supervisors
and did virtually nothing to stop or even investigate the practice." 641 F.2d at 943.
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privileges of employment.' "28 The court answered this question
affirmatively.29 In a bold move, the court disposed of the need to
prove tangible job loss in sexual harassment suits.
When an employee suffers a tangible job loss, as when he or
she is fired, concrete examples of the discrimination can be
pointed to in support of that employee's discrimination claim.
Yet, when the discrimination produces no tangible job loss, evi-
dence of this discrimination is more difficult to produce. 30 This is
precisely the problem remedied by Bundy. The court believed
that while sexual harassment is one of the most humiliating of all
forms of discrimination, 31 it may be the most difficult to prove. By
eliminating the need to prove that harassment is connected to job
consequences, the Bundy court has provided for harassment it-
self to be remedied as well as its consequences.
A further important concern was recognized by the Bundy
court. It is a concept which can be termed a vicious cycle.32 An
employee in an inferior employment position who resists ad-
vances by superiors can be forced into a position of career stagna-
tion if required to quit her job to enforce her claim for sexual
harassment. If the individual does quit, what is to prevent the
same series of events from occurring in her next job? An em-
ployer would then be able to make the endurance of sexual intim-
idation a necessary element (term or condition) of her job. 33
Under Bundy, this is an inequity which can now be remedied
through the viability of an action prior to the loss of a job.
Further, the court apparently determined that the fear of un-
merited lawsuits must be weighed against the need to provide a
sexually harassed employee with a forum in which to vent griev-
28. Id. (emphasis added). The court termed this issue a "novel question." Id.
29. Again, this position has not been held by any prior court. Id.
30. The court believed that "an employer could sexually harass a female em-
ployee with impunity by carefully stopping short of firing the employee or taking
any other tangible action against her in response to her resistance ...." Id. at
945. By eliminating the need to establish an infringement of a condition of em-
ployment, the court avoided these difficulties in proof.
31. The court stated that sexual harassment "injects the most demeaning sex-
ual stereotypes into the general work environment and.., always represents an
intentional assault on an individual's innermost privacy .... Id.
32. This is referred to as a "trilemma." The employee can: (1) oppose the
advances and suffer the attending consequences, (2) endure the harassment, or
(3) leave her position, hoping not to encounter the same problems in her next
job. Id. at 946.
33. Id.
ances. 34 Underlying this view is the idea that it is more equitable
to allow a court to determine whether an employer's actions are a
violation of a law, than to allow the employer to make such a de-
termination. The trend prior to Bundy allowed no forum until the
employer crossed the line and produced a tangible job loss for the
employee.
In summary, Bundy changed the standard of proof required in
sexual harassment claims. The pre-Bundy formula for relief in
sexual harassment suits was: proof of sexual harassment plus
loss of tangible job benefit equals a violation of a "term or condi-
tion" of employment and a violation of Title VII. Bundy has sub-
stantially altered the formula as follows: proof of sexual
harassment itself equals a violation of a "term or condition" of
employment and a violation of Title VII. Bundy represents a wel-
come change for the sexually harassed employee.
B. The Burden of Proof Under Title VII as Adapted to Sexual
Harassment
The court in Bundy determined that it was necessary to change
the typical set of elements 35 necessary to establish a prima facie
case in actions alleging discrimination under Title VII.36 This task
was simplified by the fact that a prima facie case under Title VII
had previously been held to be fiexible3 7 The prima facie case
34. While this argument was not explicitly stated by the court, it underlies the
decision and is evidenced by the court's recognition that women in the position of
Ms. Bundy "have little recourse against harassment beyond the legal recourse
Bundy seeks in this case." Id. at 945. In other words, without the Bundy holding,
there is no remedy absent proof of tangible job loss.
35. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the United
States Supreme Court established the elements of a prima facie case (specifically
pertaining to racial discrimination):
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was quali-
fied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, de-
spite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek appli-
cants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. The Court noted that these specifications will vary according to the fac-
tual situation. Id. at 802 n.13.
36. The Bundy court felt obligated to make this modification because McDon-
nell, see note 35 supra, related to hiring practices, and Bundy related to promo-
tion; McDonnell dealt with discrimination based on the victim's membership in a
disadvantaged group, whereas Bundy was not based on discrimination resulting
from membership in a disadvantaged group (sex), but rather, discrimination
based on refusal to. submit to sexual advances; and finally, McDonnell recognized
the need to adjust the prima facie case in different situations. See 641 F.2d at 951.
37. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (prima facie
case standard was "never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic"). See
also Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (broad language in support of
employee, stringent burden on employer); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp.,
495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974) (heavy burden placed
[Vol. 9: 907, 1982] Bundy v. Jackson
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needed modification regarding sexual harassment, because with-
out the need to prove tangible loss the burden of proof would be
too difficult to meet.38 Specifically, the Bundy court eliminated
the need for a sexual harassment victim to prove particular em-
ployer reactions in regard to that victim's refusal to submit to sex-
ual advances. 39 In other words, the sexual harassment victim can
recover even though he or she has to prove less in reference to
the employer's actions than the average discrimination employee
under Title VII. Once the prima facie case was found to have
been established and unsuccessfully rebutted in Bundy, the court
granted injunctive relief in the form of a specific order directing
an end to the discriminatory practices of Bundy's employers. 40
V. IMPACT
A. The Narrow, Predictable Effect
Although Bundy has been cited in a substantial number of
cases,41 its full potential has not yet been tapped. In its narrow-
on employer in rebutting prima facie case with "clear and convincing evidence").
These cases establish the flexibility of the McDonnell standards, thereby support-
ing the modification in Bundy.
38. 641 F.2d at 952.
39. The prima facie case was adjusted as follows:
"[tihe plaintiff must show (1) that she was a victim of a pattern or prac-
tice of sexual harassment attributable to her employer ... (2) that she
applied for and was denied a promotion for which she was technically eli-
gible and of which she had a reasonable expectation."
Id. at 953. Compare this with the McDonnell prima facie case, note 35 supra.
Once the prima facie case is proved, the employer must rebut the showing "by
clear and convincing evidence, that he had legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons
for denying the claimant the promotion." 641 F.2d at 953.
40. The real damage in a sexual harassment case is the harassment itself. At
least this is true when one considers the Bundy holding that harassment itself,
without proof of tangible jobs loss, is actionable (if proved). Therefore, injunctive
relief is a proper means by which to prevent the harassment. The court in Bundy
utilized guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (E.E.O.C.). See id. at 947-48. The Bundy court issued a very specific order
which was to be implemented by the lower court in order to put an end to the dis-
criminatory practices of Ms. Bundy's employers. Id. Back pay was not awarded to
Bundy because the lower court misapplied the proper allocation of the burden of
proof according to Title VII. Id. at 950.
41. See Daye v. Harris, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1248, 1251 (1981). In
Daye, a white female nurse sued under a claim of reverse discrimination on the
basis of race. The lower court entered judgment for the defendant, and the appel-
late court reversed, stating that the lower court improperly allocated the burden of
proof. See also McKenzie v. Saylor, 508 F. Supp. 641, 646 (D.D.C. 1981) (racial dis-
crimination claim was brought as a class action); Metrocare v. WMATA, 25 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 76, 82 (1981); Milton v. Weinberger, 645 F.2d 1070, 1077
est uses, Bundy should provide a springboard for sexual harass-
ment claims to be brought prior to the realization of tangible job
loss.
Those employees who are subtly and skillfully harassed in their
employment environment can now have their cases heard without
the need to quit their jobs in order to establish their cause of ac-
tion under Title VII.42 Courts can issue orders to stop the harass-
ment before it reaches the point of affecting the work
environment in the substantial way required under the strict view
in pre-Bundy decisions.43
The Bundy result is one which is both logical and just. Employ-
ees should not be subjected to sexual game playing by superiors.
Employees should not have to give up positions that have been
worked for over the years in order to eliminate the unfair employ-
ment practices by their employer. Sexual harassment is a contin-
uing form of discrimination that needs to be addressed and dealt
with on the basis of what it is, not on the basis of what conse-
quences may flow from it.
B. The Broad, Potential Effect
Bundy provides a good model for national uniformity among all
"employment" discrimination cases. Since Bundy was, in its
broadest sense, an "employment" discrimination claim, it can be
used as a vehicle for the promotion of all employment discrimina-
tion cases as viable causes of action prior to a tangible job loss.4 4
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Ramirez v. Hidalgo, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 416, 419
(1981); Parker v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 889, 893
(1981); Kapustka v. United Airlines, Inc., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1283, 1285
n.6 (1981). All the above cases utilized Bundy to modify the burden of proof.
Other uses of the Bundy decision have been as follows: Wright v. Methodist
Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. IM. 1981) (claim for homosexual harass-
ment and reliance on Bundy's recognition of sexual harassment as sex discrimina-
tion); Taylor v. Jones, 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 21,137 (1981) (injunction aspect
and Bundy's expansion of work atmosphere concept); Woerner v. Brzeczek, 26
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 897, 898 (1981) (action brought under Equal Protec-
tion Clause, and Bundy's "terms and conditions" analysis recognized but not uti-
lized due to nature of claim); Miles v. F.E.R.M. Enterprises, 29 Wash. App. 61, 627
P.2d 564 (1981) (for a racial discrimination claim in housing practices, court found
no need to show pecuniary loss to constitute a Title VII action pursuant to
Bundy).
See also KAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX BASED DISCRIMINATION 552-53 (2d
ed. 1981).
42. This is true at least in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia. However, this author argues that every federal circuit court should adopt
the Bundy rule that proof of tangible job loss is no longer required.
43. See note 40 supra.
44. See Taylor v. Jones, 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) $ 21,137 (1981); Woerner v.
Brzeczek, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 897 (1981); and Miles v. F.E.R.M. Enter-
prises, Inc., 29 Wash. App. 61, 627 P.2d 564 (1981), for such similar attempts.
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It is therefore urged that the Bundy rule be adopted in all federal
jurisdictions to insure that all sexually harassed employees are
provided with a remedy.
Further, it is urged that Bundy be utilized in another capacity.
As has been shown, a "term or condition" of employment means
different things to different courts.45 What an employer estab-
lishes as a standard is held acceptable in one context and unac-
ceptable in another. The Bundy decision focuses on the
discrimination itself as the real problem rather than just the con-
sequences produced by the discrimination. Bundy can be viewed
as contending that the discrimination itself is the wrong in need
of correction. The actual sexual advancements are the problem
and should therefore be actionable. In summary, Bundy repre-
sents an attempt to eliminate artificial barriers and reach the core
of the problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a federal appellate decision, Bundy v. Jackson is not the rule
of law in every jurisdiction.4 6 Bundy does, however, represent a
substantial step toward the very worthy goal of eliminating sexual
harassment in employment. The Bundy court recognized the fact
that an employee should not have to risk potential job loss in or-
der to have a remedy available. The rule of Bundy should be ad-
vanced in other cases and adopted by other courts continuing the
struggle against a most degrading form of discrimination, sexual
harassment in the workplace.
TERENCE J. BOURESSA
45. See, e.g., notes 8-17 supra and accompanying text.
46. The Bundy decision, although an appellate decision, was in its final status
with no potential for appeal, as was underlined by Barry A. Gottfried, one of the
attorneys for Ms. Bundy, in a telephone conversation with this author on March
15, 1981.

